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Abstract 
 
Concerning the security weakness of EPC scheme 
especially on privacy concerned applications, an 
Anonymous Mutual Authentication Protocol is 
proposed for Light-weight security inauguration on 
Class 1 Gen 2 UHF RFID (EPC C1G2) scheme. By 
utilizing the existing functions and memory bank of 
tag, we amend the processing sequence based on 
current EPC architecture.  And an auto-updating index 
number IDS is enrolled to provide privacy protection 
to EPC code. A light weight encryption algorithm 
utilizing tag’s existing PRNG and keys are introduced 
for mutual authentication. Several attacks to the RFID 
solutions can be effectively resolved through our 
improvement. 
 
Key words: RFID, light weight encryption, mutual 
authentication, privacy 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a 
technology capable of providing wireless identification 
of objects. This real time and wireless means of 
information exchanges between tags and readers 
enables emerging innovative applications in many 
areas, such as logistics, supply chain management, 
manufacturing, warehouse managements, et al. As the 
price of RFID tag is already quite cheap now, a 
standard EPC Class 1 Gen 2 UHF RFID tag be between 
0.05and 0.1 € to be considered affordable[1] . But the 
low cost demand for a RFID tag also restricts its 
capability in some aspects, such as privacy and 
authentication. A powerful malicious reader can 
illegally snoop, corrupt or manipulate upon the tags if 
within acceptable communication range. Similarly, 
tracking of people would also become possible. These 
potential risks scare away potential adoption as was the 
case with the boycott of Benetton where the garment 
maker was forced to take off RFID tags from their 
clothes. And a scan of tags attached on products inside 
a container, warehouse, etc, may also lead to corporate 
espionage. In the medical systems, any snoop and 
temper of the medical card information can cause even 
more serious problem.  
Although research literatures in RFID security 
already quite extensive and growing, most of them can 
not be easily applied into off-the-shelf tags. Among 
these researches, authentication and privacy perhaps the 
major focus in security aspect. Some current RFID tags 
employ cryptographic primitives, but they tend to be 
more expensive than EPC tags. And the Auto-ID Lab, 
the research arm of EPCglobal, also operates a special 
interest group try to proposed uses of EPC to combat 
counterfeiting of consumer items[2]. They review 
extensions to existing EPC architecture for security 
applications. Instead of incorporate cryptography into 
EPC C1G2 tags, they propose support for future, higher 
class EPC standards 
Following the same thread, we propose a novel 
anonymous mutual authentication protocol to increase 
tag privacy protection and authentication functions 
while remaining compliant with the current EPC C1G2 
Standard architecture in this article. Based on utilizing 
the already been computation unit and memory in EPC 
tag, we try to implement security functions to the 
current scheme while minimize the amendments to 
tag’s hardware. This reservation is important to 
guarantee our improvement can be easily applied into 
real application. An index-pseudonym (IDS) is used to 
replace EPC code during inventory process to prove 
privacy protection. And a light weight symmetric 
encryption algorithms is implemented for Tag-Reader 
Mutual authentication. To realize these functions, 
processing sequence must be consequently changed. 
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Our protocol is aimed to be an alternative to the 
creation of Class 2 EPC standard or as its basis. 
Organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 
II, a literature review is provided. The security treats of 
EPC C1G2 is reviewed in Section III. In section IV, our 
protocol scheme and encryption algorithm are 
introduced. Section V particularly analysis the security 
performance of our proposal. And section VI analysis 
implementation characters. Section VII will conclude 
this paper.  
2. Related work  
 
In 2005, the Version 1.1.0 of EPC C1G2 standard 
was ratified both by EPCglobal and ISO, which 
harmonized the last version with the ISO 18000-6 Type 
C amendment[3]. In contrast to established HF RFID 
standards like ISO 14443 and ISO 15693 where 
security protocols have already been deployed, the 
widely applied EPC C1G2 tag only provides an Access 
and a Kill password (APwd and KPwd) to protect 
information stored in tags. And as the EPC C1G2 tags 
can practice outstanding far-field performance, with a 
communication range of up to 10 meters, it is not 
difficult to perform a Man-in-the-middle attack from 
powerful malicious readers. Anybody possessing a 
reader could read any passersby’s tags, which can 
potentially reveal even the most private information of 
them. To the weakness on security of the standard, a lot 
of researches have been carried out in the past several 
years. The low cost demand for RFID tags forces them 
to be very resource limited. Typically, they can only 
store 5-10K logic gates. Within this gate counting, only 
between 250 and 3000 bits can be devoted to security 
functions.  Some researches try to employ primitive 
cryptographic into RFID tags, including hash, 
symmetric or asymmetric based encryption algorithms. 
But these tags tend to be more expensive than EPC tags 
currently, and can only suitable for niche and high 
value product applications. 
To investigate the extremely lightweight security 
protocols, article [4] summarized a set of  XOR based 
authentication protocols. In [5], Juels proposes a 
solution based on the use of pseudonyms, without using 
any hash function. LMAP and M2AP provide two light 
weight protocols based on the use of pseudonyms and 
XOR operations[1, 6]. The index-pseudonym refers to a 
table in which all the information about a tag is stored. 
Each tag has an associated key which be divided into 
four 96 bits parts. But these schemes are not 
sophisticated enough, Li and Wang analyzed some 
weakness of LMAP and M2AP and try to break them 
through two active attacks[7]. The first one is named 
De-synchronization attack which can break the 
communication between the tag and the reader. The 
second is a man-in-the-middle attack called Full-
disclosure attack, which can get the whole secret key of 
the tag. They give out solutions with 40% increase 
consumption of tag’s memory, but which can very 
likely lead to DOS attack to tags. Article [6] also give 
out an extension version LMAP+ to countermeasure the 
weaknesses. But unfortunately, the problems are not 
well solved as they announced. By calculating the least 
significant bits of every key and secret,  Mihaly etc 
show that LMAP can be easily broken through a few 
rounds of eavesdropping[8]. From application 
perspective, article [9] provides another light weight 
tag-reader mutual authentication scheme complying to 
EPC standards. However, this paper doesn’t consider 
privacy and vulnerable under the above attacks.  
3. Security threats 
 
The EPC C1G2 standard can be considered as 
specification for low-cost RFID tags on off-the-shelf 
applications. Even this standard already be considered a 
great success after having been adopted by many RFID 
manufacturers, the quite simple security mechanism of 
EPC C1G2 constitutes an important pitfall.  Except the 
problems mentioned in the former research, there are 
three major threats we try to resolve in this work.  
Threat 1: Trace and Tracking: The tag’s privacy is 
not considered in Class 1 Gen 2 standard, which can 
cause seriously problem to customers. As the RF signal 
usually transmit through open air media, and up to 10 
meters for EPC C1G2 tag, it will be easy for an attacker 
to obtain the EPC code of a tag by simply eavesdrops 
the air channel. Shield external RF signals/noise 
physically (i.e. Faraday cage) is not applicable in many 
real application environments.  
Threat 2: Malicious RFID Readers: Products labeled 
with tags reveal sensitive information when queried by 
readers, and they do it indiscriminately. Therefore, a 
powerful malicious reader can illegally snoop, corrupt 
or manipulate upon tags. For instance, a disgruntled or 
compromised employee with such readers can simply 
initiate Man-in-the-Middle Attack to eavesdrop and 
impersonate those random numbers and one-time-pads 
in the communication processing. Then, the attacker 
will be able to decode the cipher texts from the reader 
by performing the same operations as the tag. 
Threat 3: RFID Tag Cloning: The EPC C1G2 
standard provide solutions for tag to authenticate 
readers by examining the shared passwords between 
them. But there is no authentication to the tag from the 
reader side. This concision for the protocol leaves 
drawbacks in application. Any people know the data 
(e.g., EPC number) structure can probably generate 
fake tags and attached to counterfeit products. This 
threat can only be resolved through authentication 
methods. Even tags giving out genuine EPC numbers, 
they must still be authenticated by the reader. 
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For the above reasons, tag’s PIN or EPC code mast 
be masked and transmitted through secure channel to 
solve these problems.  
4. Anonymous Mutual Authentication 
Protocol 
 
Fortunately, EPC schemes leave spaces for 
optimization. To resolve the security weakness 
mentioned in the last section, a lot of researches have 
been carried out recently accompanied with the 
booming implementation of RFID in various 
applications. Based on our prior work[10], Here we 
propose a security intensified solution rely on the 
already been capabilities of EPC C1G2 tag. To facilitate 
the description, table 1 list some notations we used in 
this paper. 
Table 1. Notations 
Notation Descriptions 
RInventory 16bit Random No. used for singulate a 
tag 
RT,R’T,RUT 16bit Random No. Generated by Tag 
RI,R’I, RUI 16bit Random No. Generated by Reader  
IDS 16bit Index Pseudonym Random No.  
APwdM/KPwdM 16 MSBs of APwd/KPwd 
APwdL/KPwdL 16 LSBs of  APwd/KPwd 
n The serial number of current round 
 
 
4.1. Protocol description 
 
Here we modify the processing sequences of EPC 
scheme to implement privacy and mutual-
Figure 1. Anonymous Mutual Authentication Protocol 
READER TAG
Step1: Reader issuses a Query, 
QueryAdjust, or QueryRep
Query/Adjust/Rep
{IDST
(n) }
RI
Step 6: Tag Authentication ProcessStep 7.1: Execute
Step 7.2: Verify if 
Step 11.4: Record                               to DB
Step 12.1: Execute
Step 5: Tag Identification Process
Step2: Verify if Slot==0
      Y: Tag responds with  RInventory
      N: No reply
 RInventor
y
Step 3: Reader acknowledges Tag by 
issuing ACK with same  RInventory
Step 4: Verify if Valid  RInventory
      Y: responds with {IDST(n)}
      N: No reply
ACK( RInventory)
  (Prevent De-synchronization attack)
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    unknown Tag
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authentication functions. We assume that both the 
backward and the forward channels can be 
eavesdropped by an attacker, despite their asymmetry. 
A light weight encryption processes are added to tag. 
And the whole processing sequence can be split into 
four main stages, named inventory, tag authentication, 
reader authentication and updating phases. Figure 1 
particularly describes the processing sequences.  
Steps 1-5 details tag inventory process. Among 
which, steps 1-3 are exactly same as EPC C1G2 
standard. The communication must be initiated by 
readers due to the fact that low cost tags are passive. If 
the query received by a Tag within right Slot, it will 
generate a 16 bits random number RInventory through its 
PRNG and reply to the reader. Then, the RInventory be 
used in ACK by the reader. After receive corresponding 
ACK in step 4, the selected tag will send its IDST(n) to 
the reader instead of PC or EPC code. We use IDST(n) 
and IDSI(n) represent the index send from tag and reader 
respectively. They may be de-synchronized under 
attack and they are updated after each successive 
conversation to guarantee tag’s privacy. In step 5, 
reader will scan index rows IDSI(n) and IDSI(n-1) from 
database for corresponding IDST(n). Normally, a record 
including all the necessary information about the tag 
can be found, including EPC code, passwords and et al. 
Otherwise, the tag is unrecognizable to the system.  
Steps 6-9 detail the mutual authentication process 
which composed by two message exchanging 
operations. During the tag authentication step, an 
encrypted pad CCPwdT is transmitted from tag to reader 
by using APwd as the shared key. It can be 
authenticated if the reader side can successively find the 
same keys to validate the pad. The reader can also be 
authenticated with the same process in steps 8-9 except 
using different random numbers R’T and R’I. The 
encryption algorithm will be explained in the next 
section. 
Steps 10-12 describe the updating process. The IDS 
shall be updated in a secure form for protecting the 
tag’s privacy. A new pare of random numbers RUI and 
RUT separately generated in both side be used to 
generate a secret pad PADU. Accompanied with the last 
IDSI(n) and ID, a new IDS(n+1) can be generate to prevent 
De-synchronization attack in below way.  
( 1) ( ) ( )n n UIDS IDS ID PAD
+
= + ⊕    
Both IDSI(n), IDSI(n+1)  will be store in database, 
while only IDSI(n+1) should be write to tag’s EEPROM 
for next conversation.  
4.2. Encryption algorithm 
 
Based on the algorithms in article [9], here we 
implement an extreme light weight encryption 
algorithm in the mutual authentication process. As 
APwd = APwdM || APwdL and KPwd = KPwdM || 
KPwdL, a function f is used for encryption with 16 bits 
calculate capability, and two 16 bits pads (PADL and 
PADM) are generated by utilizing the Access and Kill 
passwords as ( , ( , , ), )T I TPAD f KPwd f APwd R R R= . Since 
only the tag and the reader pare storing the same 
passwords can generate the same pads, they can be 
verified by exchanging two pairs of random numbers 
RT and RI. The encryption processes are show as 
follows. 
RTL RTM
f
f
APwd
KPwd
RIL
PADL PADM
f
f
RIM
32 
bits
16 bits
APwd CCPwd⊕
 
Figure 2. Encryption Algorithm 
 
To explain the process in figure 2, we can represent 
the 16 bits random number x, y as: 
1 2 3 4x ht ht ht ht= ,        {0,1, 2, ,9, , , , }ht A B F∈ " "  
1 2 3 4y hm hm hm hm= ,   {0,1, 2, ,9, , , , }hm A B F∈ " "  
Let us use K represent the 32 bits APwd or KPwd, 
such as : 
K = a0a1a2……a29a30a31 
Consequently, we can calculate f as: 
( , , )f K x y  
= aht1aht2aht3aht4||aht1+16aht2+16aht3+16aht4+16|| 
ahm1ahm2aht3ahm4|| ahm1+16ahm2+16ahm3+16ahm4+16   [Base 2] 
= 1 2 3 4hv hv hv hv      [Base 16, where {0,1, 2, ,9, , , , }hv A B F∈ " " ] 
After the encryption process, the overall 32 bits 
PAD execute XOR with the APwd to encrypt or 
decrypt the cover-code chunk CCPwd through the 
equation: 
CCPwd APwd PAD= ⊕ . 
5. Security analysis  
 
Considering the EPC C1G2 standard, the range of 
the communication channel between a particular tag 
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and a reader may be up to 10 meters. An active attacker 
may continuously eavesdrop on the signals. Based on 
the fact that the APwd and KPwd are only 32 bits each 
in the EPC standard, a simple brute-force attack or 
other active attacks on the tag, can crack them. Our 
proposal is not aims to establish a fully secured 
operation in RFID applications, but we try to develop a 
scheme simple, low cost, and adhering to EPC 
standards. We tried to solve the security services for 
Tag-Reader mutual authentication and privacy correlate 
problems through a light weight and practically scheme 
aspect.  
To protect the privacy of a tag, our protocol 
involves a tag identity updating phases after each 
successful conversation. Unlike those hash and 
asymmetric key based solutions, our protocol 
implements an extremely light weight scheme based 
only on bitwise operations. Our protocol takes use of a 
16 bits index-pseudonym (IDS) to provide privacy 
protection. The IDS also be used as the index of a table 
where all the information about a tag is stored including 
secret keys. By implementing these functions, we can at 
least solve the following problems in the current system.  
(1) Privacy 
In addition to the original standard, we increase the 
privacy protection at the very beginning of each 
communication sessions. Instead of sending its ID 
through open channel, a tag will answer reader’s query 
by replying its current indx-pseudonym, IDS(n), and an 
eavesdropper can only get random wraps in this process. 
To prevent the possible violation of the location privacy 
of a tag owner, IDS(n) will be updated after each 
successful communication session, and IDS(n+1) will be 
calculated separately in both side. As the updated 
IDS(n+1) do not appear on the insecure open channel 
during updating process, it makes difficulties for an 
attacker to identify and track the tag. The tag ID and 
corresponding user confidentiality can be kept secure to 
guarantee users privacy maximally. Further more, by 
update the IDS(n) after the mutual authentication, a 
future security compromise on an RFID tag will not 
reveal data previously transmitted and forward Security 
can be guaranteed. 
But before a successive updating of IDS, there still 
has possibility that the attacker can distinct and follow a 
user for some while. For instance, an attacker may 
sends hello messages to the tag to receives the respond 
IDS(n), then he stops the authentication process. As the 
tag may have chance lose contact with legitimate 
readers and do not updated its IDS(n) for a certain period, 
the attacker can repeats the above action and get the 
same IDS(n) in this interval. 
(2) Mutual Authentication  
By authenticating in step 7, a fake tag or a malicious 
tag which does not posses the correct keys can be 
eliminated. We can prevent attackers cheating backend 
system through cloned tags or tag impersonation attack 
by this way. And for authenticating the reader to the tag, 
a validate reader mast have the proper privilege to 
access the database and distill the required passwords, 
APwd and KPwd. There have been a lot of techniques 
to prevent such kind of information leaking in backend 
systems. And consequently, any malicious readers try 
to execute Genuine Reader Impersonation Attack to 
cheat tags can be prevented.  
And as unique random numbers, RI, R’I and RT, R’T 
are used in each communication sessions, we can finely 
defend replay attacks in our protocol. And by enrolling 
mutual authentication and encryption functions to the 
EPC scheme, we can fend off many threats like 
malicious snooping readers, disgruntled employee, 
Cloned Tag, man-in-the-middle attacks, et al. 
(3) Prevent De-synchronization Attack 
To protect an RFID tag’s privacy, our protocol 
involved a tag identity update process after each 
successive protocol round. The IDS take over all the 
identification functions of the original tag’s ID (EPC or 
PC) in the first part of privacy protected protocols and 
the keys values are depend on which IDS can be found 
in step 5.  So the synchronization of secret information 
between the database and tags are very important to 
guarantee their following protocol runs.  
These kinds of attacks always try to break the 
synchronization at both sides or leave the protocol 
incomplete. As described in article [7], an active 
attacker can initiate a man-in-the-middle attack to leave 
the update process wrong in tag side by change the 
random numbers RUT or RUI, or just simply block off 
the update messages from reader to tag side. For 
example, RUT is generated by tag’s PRNG, reader side 
may be fraud if RUT have been tempered, and finally led 
to different updating results in both sides. And 
furthermore, this attack has high probability to cause 
DOS attack to tags by preventing them from successive 
updating.  
Here we store all the current and newly generated 
IDS to database to insure even the tag did not update its 
IDST(n) in the last round still can be recognizable. Our 
protocol can solve the attack with no extra addition 
storing in tag’s EEPROM. 
 
6. Implementation analysis 
 
Considering EPC C1G2 tags are very 
computationally constrained devices, we only take use 
of the existing functions in the tag. Here we only use 
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bitwise operations. As they have already been 
implemented in the existing EPC C1G2 tags on off-the-
shelf products, there will be no extra gate counting 
needed. To implement our protocol, we need to 
redesign the processing sequence on both the tag and 
the reader side.  
For the memory storage, we consider its use as an 
input/output medium capable of interfacing with a set 
of crypto operation within the tag. And we also try to 
take use of the existing memories of EPC C1G2 tag to 
avoid extra storage costs. Our solution utilizes the 
Reserved memory bank in EPC C1G2 tag where 
containing two 32 bits passwords, APwd and KPwd. 
The kill and access passwords are individually lockable, 
as EPC, TID, and User memory. These memory banks 
are always readable regardless of their lock status. The 
reserved memory mast be read/write unlocked to 
provide updating capability in our protocol. The 
encryption algorithm is based on 16 bits operation, 
which divides these memories into 4 pairs, APwdM, 
APwdL, KPwdM and KPwdL. We also use the 16 bit PC 
from EPC memory to act as ID in our protocol. Here we 
take use of the existing keys to avoid extra hardware 
amendment and achieve trade-off between security and 
applicability. Our proposed scheme can still be 
applicable and more strengthened, if the length of 
APwd and KPwd be extended in active tags or 
enhanced tags used for high value items.  
Besides the existing storages, our protocols need to 
add a 16 bits rewritable memory storage space from 
User memory for IDS. EPC memory and TID memory 
are leaving unchanged, which still can be achieved after 
authentication.  
7. Conclusion 
To summarize, many former proposals are based on 
the hypothesis that low-cost tags can not generate 
random numbers, and they make almost all the 
computational load fall on the reader side. Based on the 
latest research achievements, we provide an 
Anonymous Mutual Authentication Protocol in this 
paper concerning security attributes of EPC C1G2 
standard. To alleviate these flaws, we take advantage of 
the EPC C1G2 standard and utilized its already existing 
function PRNG. As the random numbers and keys are 
all 16 bits, our algorithms are designed accompany to 
the hardware restriction to insure it can be easily 
applied to the existing applications. Our solution may 
be not fully secure but it is simple, cost-effective, and 
light-weight to be implemented on tag. Through the 
four phases in our protocol, we can thwart many 
existing threats such as malicious readers, man-in-the-
middle attacks, Cloned Tag, full disclosure, track and 
tracing, et al. Important related problems, such as 
implementation performance and security verification, 
will be addressed in future reports. 
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